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INTRODUCTION
Two NOTIONS WHICH are so closely related that one would not even put them on different sides of the same coin are that of a community indifference curve and that of a representative consumer. A representative consumer exists if the market behavior of an aggregate of different consumers is as if it were the market behavior of a number of identical hypothetical consumers, each with the same level of income. It is implicit or explicit in much of economic analysis. Community indifference curves have a long history in international trade theory. They are at least as old as Jevons. That there are problems with their existence was realized by Wicksell [27] and many economists since. Samuelson's 1956 paper [22] is still the best accessible statement of the problem and its solution.
In a classic 1953 paper, "Community Preference Fields" [10] , Gorman established: (i) given that each consumer has sufficient income, then community preferences exist if the marginal propensity to consume for any good is the same across consumers, and (ii) given (i), income redistribution "does not matter" in that it does not affect market behavior.
These conditions imply linear expansion paths not necessarily through the origin with identical slopes across consumers. 2 Samuelson proposed an alternative general, more egalitarian judgements result in a lower socially representative income level. This means that the choice of the socially representative income level corresponds locally to a Bergson-Samuelson welfare function. The former, i.e., choosing one point on the income continuum is, however, much simpler and more intuitively appealing than the latter. This is perhaps the best way to grasp the informational economy for the making of welfare statements of the assumption of community preferences. This point is illustrated in Section 5.
I have two specifications of the requirements for community preferences. The weaker of the two does not require maximizing behavior but does require the absence of money illusion. The stronger specification assumes micro-maximizing behavior and requires the same of the representative consumer; i.e., it should be possible "to integrate back" from the market budget share relationships to a utility function. Recently, general equilibrium theorists have shown considerable interest in a related issue. In distinction to my problem (which is: when can we aggregate consistently?), these theorists have asked: when can we decompose consistently? Basically there are two theorems. The first, proved by Sonnenschein [25] , says that locally, any n continuous market demand functions consistent with the budget constraint and homogeneous of degree zero in prices and aggregate income can be decomposed into the n demand functions of each of n hypothetical utility maximizing consumers. Each can have the same level of income but, in general, has different preferences. Sonnenschein says this "4provides a striking indication that the (budget and homogeneity) restrictions largely exhaust the empirical implications of the-utility hypothesis for market demand functions". The second theorem is a global one and says that a similar decomposition can be carried out for market excess demand functions. In Debreu's [5] version this is so for some distribution of initial endowments; in McFadden, et al. [17, Theorem 3] , it is for any initial distribution, but decomposition works only for market excess demand functions in a neighborhood of the aggregate endowment.
Clearly, consistent aggregation is sufficient but not necessary for consistent decomposition. However, when decomposition is required for all initial distributions, it comes close to being the same as consistent aggregation. It is clear that there are some interesting results to be obtained in the middle ground between the two problems.
In particular, this is so for the fixed income distribution case with which I do not directly deal in this paper but which McFadden, et al. have raised as an open question. Pearce [20] devoted a chapter to it, but apart from some differential conditions and one very special solution did not get very far towards a general solution. The functional forms in this paper are much more general, though still not the most general solutions to this problem.
THE MAIN RESULTS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
The integrability condition for an individual consumer is nothing more or less than the condition that one should be able to "integrate back" to his utility function given his market behavior, i.e., integrate back to the specification of preferences from the implicit marginal conditions for utility maximizing or cost minimizing behavior. Expressed in terms of quantities demanded, it is given by the conditions The next results are devoted to two special cases of GL. The first is the one in which Yo is homogeneous in y. The second is the one in which yo is independent of p. It turns out that under both RNNM and R, the latter implies the former, but not conversely. For obvious reasons, the case where yo is independent of p will be given the name "price independent generalized linearity", PIGL. The fact that lim O(x' -1)/a = log x, implies that as a -40 (13') becomes log M = log a + u log (c/a). This has exactly the same form as (14) where a = B and (c/a) = H. Thus it is clear how the special case (14) arises. 9 Diewert [9, pp. 129-130] gives a specific indirect utility function whose cost function is a member of the class defined by (13). In the context of identical preferences, he points out that his special case aggregates consistently. A similar example is given in Diewert [8] . This interesting paper also shows that if the number of consumers is less than the number of goods, individual maximizing behavior does impose some restrictions on aggregate behavior other than adding-up. Finally, an indirect utility form, (13) belongs to the "polar-form" class arising in Gorman's [13] price aggregation theorem.
Again a, b ought to be concave. Equation (14) can be written as (HB)"uBl "U. This is a weighted average of HB and B which suggests that (HB) and B ought both to be concave. Incidentally, since (14) implies that the budget share equations depend on log y, this case ought to be entitled PIGLOG!
The Hence, yo is linear homogeneous in y and independent of prices.
Q.E.D.
This concludes the presentation and interpretation of the main results. Those interested in a discussion of the implications of the main features of these results for the econometric study of demand systems will find one in Muellbauer [19] . That paper is in the context of identical preferences" but the main points remain the same so that there is no point in repeating them here. However, a brief application to the optimal commodity tax problem is included as the last section of this paper.
Now that the precise sense of my notion of community preferences has been explained, it is worth briefly discussing Scitovsky's [23] concept of social indifference curves. As Samuelson [22] makes clear, Scitovsky was interested in the aggregate minimum requirements contours when each consumer is at a specified and fixed utility level. Translating into price space this can be expressed by a function #(u,... ., UN, p) -h= 1 mh(uh, p). Given the u's, X,# is concave in p and is defined without restricting individual preferences. Given p, X defines the utility possibility locus for a given amount of aggregate money income. Although it has some theoretical uses, it is obviously a quite different concept from mine. However, given Gorman's or my form of individual preferences the utility possibility loci are very substantially restricted. For the former, Xk = Yah(p) + (Yuh)b(p), the utility possibility contour slopes are independent of prices. For the l There is also some discussion of generalization to taste differences including an approximation theorem for stochastic differences in tastes. Although forms (15) and (16) are discussed there, no necessity results for these forms are attempted. We shall show (at//yo)/(aX/ayo) = A (equation (7) We now show that equation (7) is valid by proving that tP'(yo)/X'(yo) is independent of yo and of y. In a way, this is obvious since the right-hand side of (34) is the same for all k which suggests that it is independent of Yk, all k, and hence of yo. Formally, the result is obtained by differentiating (34) with respect to Yr, r =A k: As is easy to see, the rule implies that other things (substitution effects) being similar, tj ought to be low if qj(yw, p)/Qj is high. But this will happen precisely when j is a good which has a big weight in the consumption patterns of the poor, i.e., is a "necessity". The more egalitarian is W, the bigger is the difference between yO and yo and hence, in general, the more will the ratio qj(yw, p)/Qj differ from unity. Thus the operational significance of the degree of egalitarianism in the W( ) function is made very clear.
latter, X = 2Gh(uh, H(p))B(p), these slopes depend on prices only through the scalar function H(p).
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This example well illustrates the striking informational economy for welfare judgements which is implied by the assumption that individual preferences are such that community preferences exist. Because W may not exist for all u and because of possible concavity problems for some u, there are likely to be income ranges for which (A12) is not defined. Finally, I have not been able to push further the analysis of (A9) when K(e) does not have the special form y/82.
